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in the child's human capital.
The resulting budget constraint, is the elasticity of the child's income with respect to investment in the child's human capital. I will henceforth refer to γ as the "earnings return to human capital investment."
2 See Becker and Tomes (1986) for an analysis that relaxes this assumption.
in the child's human capital so as to maximize the Cobb-Douglas utility function
The altruism parameter α , which lies between 0 and 1, measures the parent's taste for it y relative to 1 , − t i C . If the parent is cognizant of equations (1) The first-order condition for maximizing this utility function is
Solving for the optimal choice of 1 , − t i I yields
This simple result has several intuitive implications. First, higher-income parents use part of their greater wherewithal to invest more in their children's human capital. Second, parents' investment in their children's human capital is increasing in parental altruism α . Third, parental investment also is increasing in γ , the earnings return to human capital investment. In other words, parents are more inclined to invest in their children's human capital when the payoff is higher.
It is now straightforward to proceed to deriving first the implications for the intergenerational income association between it y and 1 , − t i y , and then the implications for the role of grandparents. Substituting equation (9) y . In the present context, this quantity, which I will denote as β , is the steady-state intergenerational income elasticity. As shown in Greene (2012, p. 919) , this quantity is the sum of the two autoregressive parameters, the slope coefficient in equation (10) and the serial correlation coefficient in equation (3), divided by 1 plus their product. Thus, the steady-state intergenerational income elasticity is
Equation (11) indicates that the intergenerational income elasticity is positive for both of two reasons -because γ is positive (i.e., richer parents' greater investment in their children's human capital makes their children richer) and because λ is positive (i.e., richer parents tend to have more favorable endowments, which tend to be passed on to their children through genetic and cultural inheritance). Suppose, for example, that 3 . 0 = γ and 2 . 0 = λ (or vice versa, as the symmetry in how γ and λ enter equation (11) will lead to the same outcome). Then the intergenerational income elasticity is 47
What is most pertinent for this conference, though, is what the model implies about the role of grandparents. Lagging equation (10) by one generation, multiplying it by the heritability coefficient λ , and subtracting the result from equation (10) 
In this regression of the child's log income on both parental and grandparental log income, the coefficient of parental log income is positive, but the coefficient of grandparental log income is a small negative quantity! For example, with 3 . 0 = γ and 2 . 0 = λ , the coefficient of parental log income is 0.5, and the coefficient of grandparental log income is -0.06. This implication of a negative coefficient for grandparental income, first noted by Becker and Tomes (1979) , is initially surprising, but it does not really mean that an exogenous increase in grandparental income harms the child's income. Rather, it reflects a subtle implication of higher grandparental income conditional on the amount of parental income. If the parent did not earn more despite the advantages of higher grandparental income, this signals that the parent got a poor draw on her or his genetic/cultural endowment, and that poor draw tends to be passed on to some extent to the child.
Intergenerational mobility scholars sometimes presume that intergenerational autocorrelations decline geometrically -that is, that the correlation between grandparent and child is the square of the parent-child correlation, that the correlation between great-grandparent and child is the cube, etc. There is no particular basis for that presumption, and it is contradicted by the second-order autoregressive structure of equation (12). In fact, if the grandparental coefficient in equation (12) is really negative, the autocorrelations decline more rapidly than geometrically. For example, with
, and hence about a 0.47 correlation between parent and child log incomes, applying standard results on the autocorrelations implied by a second-order autoregressive process (Box, Jenkins, and Reinsel, 1994, p. 60) shows that the correlation between the grandparent's and child's log incomes is about 0.18, somewhat less than the square of 0.47. And the correlation between the great-grandparent's and child's log incomes is only about 0.06. But is the model's prediction of a negative grandparental coefficient in equation (12) realistic? In principle, the prediction is testable with multigenerational data. Indeed, Behrman and Taubman (1985) did explicitly test the prediction by estimating an equation like equation (12) As exemplified by papers at this conference, however, numerous empirical researchers are now using various new data sets to re-examine multigenerational associations in socioeconomic status. Not only are these studies still failing to find evidence of a negative coefficient for grandparental status; some of them are estimating statistically significant positive coefficients. Relatedly, some are finding that intergenerational autocorrelations decline more slowly than at a geometric rate. Clark and Cummins (2012) , and Long and Ferrie (2012) . A classic early study of multigenerational autocorrelations is Hodge (1966). generation" is another way of opening up the possibility of a positive coefficient for grandparents' status. Fourth, discrimination and other types of what George Borjas (1995) has dubbed "ethnic capital" can generate group effects that would be correlated with the status of both parents and grandparents. Finally, measurement error could create the appearance of grandparental effects even when they are not really present. Accordingly, in the next section, I extend the model of this section to incorporate some of these processes.
Extending the Theory to Encompass Additional Avenues of Multigenerational Transmission
Let's start with the possibility of grandparental investment in children's human capital. If the grandparents' preferences for such investment line up with those of the parents, then the model of the previous section needs no modification at all. In this case, the grandparent can just invest in the parent as modeled in Section 1 and trust the parent to "pass it on" in the way that they mutually prefer.
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In contrast, the other avenues of multigenerational transmission mentioned at the end of Section 1 are so easy to model that even I can do it. First, let's reconsider the assumption in equation (3) that the child's direct genetic and cultural inheritance comes only from the parent.
As noted in Chapter 6 of Becker (1981) For purposes of this conference, the most important implication is that equation (12) (14) differs from equation (12) in two notable ways. First, now great-grandparental log income enters with a negative coefficient, which is even smaller in magnitude than the one that appeared for grandparental log income in equation (12). Second, the coefficient for grandparental log income might be positive now because of the incorporation of a grandparental contribution to the child's genetic/cultural inheritance. In particular, the grandparental coefficient is positive if
Thus, if the advent of new and better multigenerational data demonstrates that the grandparental coefficient is indeed positive, one possible interpretation will be that grandparental contributions to genetic or cultural inheritance loom large enough in enough families to dominate the negative "effect" discussed in Section 1.
A different extension of the model is that various types of "ethnic capital" might cause the intercept in equation (12) or (14) to differ across subpopulations. In particular, a group with a lower µ (the intercept in the earnings function shown as equation (4)) or a lower altruism parameter α would have a lower intercept in equation (12) or (14). Suppose, for example, that racial discrimination in the United States causes African-American families to have a lower earnings function intercept µ and therefore lower intercepts in equations (10), (12), and (14). Then a failure to model the between-group difference in intercepts in equation (12) or (14) amounts to omission of group fixed effects. Applying the usual omitted-variables-bias analysis shows that, because both parental log income and grandparental log income (as well as greatgrandparental log income in equation (14)) have positive partial correlations with the omitted group effect, all the ancestral coefficients are pushed in a positive direction. This would be a force towards slower-than-geometric decay in multigenerational autocorrelations. (14). Of course, if within-group sample sizes are large enough, an obvious way to check the applicability of this interpretation is to control for group fixed effects in the estimation of regressions like equation (12) or (14).
Summary and Discussion
As shown in Section 1, existing theoretical models in the tradition of Becker and Tomes (1979) predict that a second-order autoregression of child's socioeconomic status on the status of both parents and grandparents will involve a small negative coefficient for grandparental status.
Correspondingly, intergenerational autocorrelations should decline at a faster-than-geometric rate. Accumulating empirical evidence, however, suggests that, in at least some times and places, grandparental coefficients are positive, and autocorrelations decline more slowly than geometrically. This evidence does not mean that the Becker-Tomes analysis is wrong as far as it goes; rather, it means that the analysis does not go far enough. In Section 2, I have suggested several straightforward extensions of the Becker-Tomes analysis that can account for positive higher-order coefficients in multigenerational autoregressions and for autocorrelations that decline more slowly than geometrically.
A major virtue of the Becker-Tomes analysis was its demonstration that positive intergenerational correlations in socioeconomic status can arise from the greater wherewithal of richer parents to invest in their children's human capital, from genetic or cultural inheritance, or from all of the above. Because these different sources of intergenerational status transmission have similar empirical manifestations, it is difficult to tell them apart. A similar lesson can be drawn from Section 2 of the present paper. A multitude of different processes can generate positive higher-order coefficients in multigenerational autoregressions and autocorrelations that decay more slowly than geometrically. Distinguishing those processes from each other therefore will be a difficult challenge for scholars investigating multigenerational inequality.
